Listed in order and by topic.
Authored by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay.
See also the Searchable Federalist Papers courtesy of the Emory University School of Law, Atlanta, Georgia. Or the one from the Library of Congress' Thomas service here.
The Importance of the Union (1-14)
| No. 1 | General Introduction HAMILTON |
| No. 2 | Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence JAY |
| No. 3 | Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (con't) JAY |
| No. 4 | Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (con't) JAY |
| No. 5 | Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (con't) JAY |
| No. 6 | Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States HAMILTON |
| No. 7 | Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States (con't) HAMILTON |
| No. 8 | The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States HAMILTON |
| No. 9 | The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection HAMILTON |
| No. 10 | The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection (con't) MADISON |
| No. 11 | The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy HAMILTON |
| No. 12 | The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue HAMILTON |
| No. 13 | Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government HAMILTON |
| No. 14 | Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered MADISON |
Defects of the Articles of Confederation (15-22)
| No. 15 | The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union HAMILTON |
| No. 16 | The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) HAMILTON |
| No. 17 | The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) HAMILTON |
| No. 18 | The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) HAMILTON AND MADISON |
| No. 19 | The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) HAMILTON AND MADISON |
| No. 20 | The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) HAMILTON AND MADISON |
| No. 21 | Other Defects of the Present Confederation HAMILTON |
| No. 22 | Other Defects of the Present Confederation (con't) HAMILTON |
Arguments for the type of Government contained in the Constitution (23-36)
| No. 23 | The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union HAMILTON |
| No. 24 | The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered HAMILTON |
| No. 25 | The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered (con't) HAMILTON |
| No. 26 | The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered HAMILTON |
| No. 27 | The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered (con't) HAMILTON |
| No. 28 | The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered (con't) HAMILTON |
| No. 29 | Concerning the Militia HAMILTON |
| No. 30 | Concerning the General Power of Taxation HAMILTON |
| No. 31 | Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) HAMILTON |
| No. 32 | Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) HAMILTON |
| No. 33 | Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) HAMILTON |
| No. 34 | Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) HAMILTON |
| No. 35 | Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) HAMILTON |
| No. 36 | Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) HAMILTON |
The Republican form of Government (37-51)
| No. 37 | Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government MADISON |
| No. 38 | The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed MADISON |
| No. 39 | The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles MADISON |
| No. 40 | The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained MADISON |
| No. 41 | General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution MADISON |
| No. 42 | The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered MADISON |
| No. 43 | The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered (con't) MADISON |
| No. 44 | Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States MADISON |
| No. 45 | The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered MADISON |
| No. 46 | The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared MADISON |
| No. 47 | The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts MADISON |
| No. 48 | These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other MADISON |
| No. 49 | Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention HAMILTON OR MADISON |
| No. 50 | Periodical Appeals to the People Considered HAMILTON OR MADISON |
| No. 51 | The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments HAMILTON OR MADISON |
The Legislative Branch (52-66)
| No. 52 | The House of Representatives HAMILTON OR MADISON |
| No. 53 | The House of Representatives (con't) HAMILTON OR MADISON |
| No. 54 | The Apportionment of Members Among the States HAMILTON OR MADISON |
| No. 55 | The Total Number of the House of Representatives HAMILTON OR MADISON |
| No. 56 | The Total Number of the House of Representatives (con't) HAMILTON OR MADISON |
| No. 57 | The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation HAMILTON OR MADISON |
| No. 58 | Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered MADISON |
| No. 59 | Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members HAMILTON |
| No. 60 | Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (con't) HAMILTON |
| No. 61 | Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (con't) HAMILTON |
| No. 62 | The Senate HAMILTON OR MADISON |
| No. 63 | The Senate (con't) HAMILTON OR MADISON |
| No. 64 | The Powers of the Senate JAY |
| No. 65 | The Powers of the Senate (con't) HAMILTON |
| No. 66 | Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered HAMILTON |
The Executive Branch (67-77)
| No. 67 | The Executive Department HAMILTON |
| No. 68 | The Mode of Electing the President HAMILTON |
| No. 69 | The Real Character of the Executive HAMILTON |
| No. 70 | The Executive Department Further Considered HAMILTON |
| No. 71 | The Duration in Office of the Executive HAMILTON |
| No. 72 | The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered HAMILTON |
| No. 73 | The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power HAMILTON |
| No. 74 | The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive HAMILTON |
| No. 75 | The Treaty-Making Power of the Executive HAMILTON |
| No. 76 | The Appointing Power of the Executive HAMILTON |
| No. 77 | The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered HAMILTON |
The Judicial Branch (78-83)
| No. 78 | The Judiciary Department HAMILTON |
| No. 79 | The Judiciary (con't) HAMILTON |
| No. 80 | The Powers of the Judiciary HAMILTON |
| No. 81 | The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority HAMILTON |
| No. 82 | The Judiciary Continued HAMILTON |
| No. 83 | The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury HAMILTON |
Conclusions and Miscellaneous Ideas
| No. 84 | Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered HAMILTON |
| No. 85 | Concluding Remarks HAMILTON |